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Abstract: 
Cyberspace is a unique human-made environment on which global society is increasingly 
dependent for its well-being. At the same time, states and non-state actors are engaged in 
detrimental cyber activity that can threaten to transform this special environment into just 
another battleground. Diplomatic efforts to develop international “norms of responsible 
state behavior” have not kept pace with growing military cyber security capabilities. A 
Sino-Russian initiative for an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” 
has problematic aspects and could prove divisive if brought before the UN General 
Assembly for adoption. A series of reports by UN Group of Governmental Experts have 
generated some important general conclusions and positive recommendations for 
confidence building measures, but they remain only proposals. There is a need for more 
Western leadership in ensuring that expert recommendations are transformed into state 
commitments if the peaceful nature of cyberspace is to be preserved. 
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Seizing the Diplomatic Initiative to Control Cyber Conflict* 
Conflict has always been a feature of the international system, and states have devised 
means of dealing with it along the diplomacy–defense spectrum. Today, however, the 
international community faces a special challenge regarding conflict in an entirely new domain. 
Unlike the familiar domains of land, sea, and air, the Internet (more broadly understood as 
cyberspace) is a human, not a natural, construct that has only existed for some 20 years. 
Cyberspace constitutes an environment significantly different from other realms of 
internationally regulated activity. It would be hard to exaggerate its importance for contemporary 
global society, or the high level of dependency on a cyberspace free from threat of deliberate 
damage or disruption from state actors.  
This dependency reflects the rapid growth of Internet users, recently surpassing the 3 
billion mark worldwide, and the exponential increase of participation beyond the original focus 
of activity in Europe and North America. Today, the majority of Internet users live in the global 
south. Developing countries have increased their share from 44 percent in 2006 to 62 percent in 
2011.1 Nigeria had approximately 200,000 Internet users in 2002. In 2013, it had 49 million. This 
wide participation of global populations is ensuring increased government scrutiny everywhere 
about the public policy implications of the Internet, including the field of cyber security. 
Although to date much of that governmental attention has focused on countering malevolent 
action by cyber criminals, the threat of interstate cyber conflict is beginning to emerge as a 
pressing issue for consideration.  
The Issue of State Behavior 
Seeking international cyber security through diplomatic means requires taking account of 
the current relations amongst states. A 2012 survey by the UN Institute for Disarmament 
Research (UNIDIR) revealed that 114 states have a national cyber security program, and 47 of 
these assign some role to the armed forces in carrying out that national program. Yet according 
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to the UNIDIR research, only six states have published military cyber security strategies, with 
varying degrees of specificity.2 While these findings point to a lack of transparency in cyber 
security policies, they also suggest that a certain “militarization” of cyberspace is underway 
without much public debate on the matter. It is difficult to identify an explicit political decision 
taken in leading cyber powers to authorize state-sponsored cyber attacks in this new 
environment, yet they seem to have occurred. (for example, the Stuxnet cyber attack against an 
Iranian nuclear facility in 2009–2010). As more information emerges from underneath the cloak 
of secrecy covering much state-conducted cyber action abroad, an embryonic cyber arms race is 
emerging.  
As is frequently the case with new technology, the United States was an early adopter and 
has set the pace for others. The U.S. military, for example, created its Cyber Command in 2009 
with an initial FY2010 budget allocation for $114 million. Just four years later, its FY2014 
allocation is $447 million, nearly a four-fold increase. A similar increase of personnel is also 
underway with Cyber Command seeking to augment its force by over 4,000 new staffers from 
the approximately 900 in 2013.3 Additionally, the Department of Defense in April 2015 released 
its Cyber Strategy to provide policy direction over the next five years. This document attaches 
great importance to the cyber threat, recalling that the Director of National Intelligence 
characterized it as the number one strategic threat against the United States. The Cyber Strategy 
foresees the establishment of a Cyber Mission Force of 6,200 personnel when fully operational 
that will be organized into 133 teams. More disturbing than the expansion of human and 
financial resources is the emphasis on offensive, in addition to defensive, operations in the 
underlying strategy. Among the five strategic goals set by the Cyber Strategy, one is to “[b]uild 
and maintain viable cyber options and plans to use these options to control conflict escalation 
and to shape the conflict environment at all stages.”4 Despite the somewhat opaque military 
language, the document makes clear that such external force projection would be part of a 
“comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy” that DOD is to help develop and implement.5  
Documents released earlier in 2013 by Edward Snowden have provided details of the 
U.S. policy for offensive cyber operations, as set out in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 20 of 
October 2012.6 This directive indicates that offensive operations would not be restricted to 
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countering imminent threats or cyber attacks, but could also seek to advance unspecified national 
interests. The upper rungs of this cyber ladder of escalation are alarming – cyber effects 
operations that will result in what the PPD euphemistically terms “significant consequences” 
allow for actions causing “loss of life” and “significant damage to property,” although this level 
of operations would apparently require presidential approval.  
Despite the PPD statement that the United States would conduct any external cyber 
operations in a manner “consistent with its obligations under international law,” it does not really 
address the major implications of such offensive cyber operations for international security. The 
policy does acknowledge that among the “risk” factors taken into account for foreign operations 
are introducing “unwelcome norms of international behavior” or impacting “the security and 
stability of the Internet.” Regrettably, the policy does not indicate a diplomatic dimension 
beyond referring to a prior call by the Obama administration to develop “an international 
consensus around norms of [responsible state] behavior in cyberspace.”7  
Snowden’s revelation of this policy for offensive cyber operations, alongside the rapid 
increase in military cyber capabilities, has likely overshadowed the limited earlier appeal to forge 
a global consensus. As has often been the case in the past, other states are likely to take their lead 
from U.S. policy and action in determining what posture they should adopt in this new realm of 
international security. It may represent wishful thinking on my part to hope that this unintended 
“transparency” measure by the U.S. would lead states (and civil society) to stare into the abyss 
and question whether they really want cyberspace to serve as just another domain of international 
conflict. If not, what might be done to preclude, or at least mitigate, its “weaponization?” Any 
preventive action must be taken in cooperation with other leading cyber powers notably China.  
Tense U.S.–Chinese Cyber Security Relations  
Even the most casual observer of the Western media should note the growing attention 
paid to cyber attacks and the losses of information that both public and private entities have 
suffered. These losses now regularly involve millions of compromised accounts, ranging from 
personal data of the customers of major corporations to that of U.S. Government employees. In 
particular, China has been accused of state-sponsored cyber espionage directed at U.S. 
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government and business interests. After years of discreetly avoiding naming China as the culprit 
in these cyber attacks, the U.S. government has decided starting in 2013 to identify Beijing as the 
principal perpetrator and to publicly call upon it to desist 
The U.S. Department of Defense has been especially vocal in accusing China in these 
cyber intrusions, linking them to the compromise of several U.S. weapon systems, including the 
F-35 and F-18 fighter jets and the PAC3 missile. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
has referred to cyber threats as “terribly dangerous” and has called for talks with China and 
others to “establish international norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace.”8 Indeed, the 
issue of cyber espionage has figured prominently in U.S.–China bilateral relations and has found 
its way onto the agenda of the highest levels of discussion, such as the summit between 
Presidents Obama and Xi in June of 2013 It would appear, though, that the political attention to 
the problem has not yielded sufficient results.  
In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of indicting 
five serving officers of the People’s Liberation Army for engaging in cyber espionage against 
U.S. corporations. Chinese officials have angrily denied these charges and have even suggested 
that the United States “fabricated” the evidence against the PLA officers.9 Beijing has also 
responded to the United States’ charges by suspending its involvement in a bilateral cyber 
working group that had only been recently established.10 These publicized actions represent a 
significant escalation over the previous reliance on behind-the-scenes diplomatic protests, and 
demonstrate the difficulty of sustaining a substantive cyber security dialogue between the two 
powers.  
It is noteworthy that even as the U.S. military moves to significantly enhance its cyber 
security capacities, the Defense Department is still advocating a cooperative approach to address 
some potential cyber conflict. The Cyber Strategy specifically seeks to strengthen the U.S. cyber 
dialogue with China in order to enhance strategic stability. It also offers to do the same with 
Russia “[i]f and when U.S.–Russia military relations resume.”11 This approach looks to 
diplomatic rather than military initiatives and would ultimately seek to agree on “rules of the 
road” to govern state behavior in cyberspace. Whether global cyber security will be characterized 
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by adversarial or cooperative approaches may depend on the near-term success or failure of 
efforts by cyber powers to develop these norms of responsible state behavior.  
The Quest for Norms of Responsible State Behavior 
The idea of agreeing upon such norms is not a novel international concept. States have 
long worked out common standards to cover their interaction, including how to manage 
conflicts. These agreements have applied to the traditional domains of land, sea, and air, and 
have evolved to accommodate changes in technology and the introduction of new armaments. 
However, cyberspace constitutes a unique domain that raises special concerns and considerations 
for states and their national security establishments.  
The United States was the first country to recognize officially the inter-relationship 
between national and global cyber security and to set out its vision for how the international 
community should proceed. In May 2011, the Obama administration issued its International 
Strategy for Cyber Space. This path-breaking policy statement acknowledged the immense 
dependency of society on the operation of networked technologies and the increasing threats to 
the secure use of these technologies. The policy noted, “Cyber security threats can even endanger 
international peace and security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into 
cyberspace.” To counter this tendency for some states to “exert traditional power in cyberspace,” 
the policy called for a new international consensus on “norms for responsible state behavior” in 
cyberspace. The statement promised early and energetic action in this regard: “We will engage 
the international community in frank and urgent dialogue, to build consensus around principles 
of responsible behavior in cyberspace…”12  
The policy directions set out in the International Strategy are progressive and infused 
with a cooperative security spirit. But having expressed the goal and stressed the urgency of the 
requirement, the Obama administration has found it difficult to translate its policy vision into a 
diplomatic process to achieve it. Although more than four years have passed since its 
International Strategy, the United States has yet to endorse any multilateral process to develop 
and agree on norms for state behavior, and has struggled to establish or maintain even bilateral 
dialogues on the issue with key states. 
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The Sino–Russian Code of Conduct Initiative 
Although the U.S. endorsement of the idea of a set of global norms to govern inter-state 
behavior in cyberspace constituted an important diplomatic step, it was China and Russia that 
proved first off the mark in presenting a proposal for a package of global norms to govern state 
behavior. In an official document circulated at the September 2011 UN General Assembly 
session, the delegations of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan submitted 
an International Code of Conduct for Information Security. In the covering note explaining the 
proposal, the delegations stated that the rapid development of “information and 
telecommunication technologies could potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with 
the objectives of maintaining international stability and security.” It went on to say that the 
proposed international code of conduct had been elaborated in the form of a potential General 
Assembly resolution and called for deliberations within the UN framework on this text “with the 
aim of achieving the earliest possible consensus on international norms and rules guiding the 
behavior of states in the information space.”13  
By this initiative, China and Russia had adroitly taken advantage of the policy opening 
provided by the Obama administration’s International Strategy just a few months earlier. 
Diplomacy, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The Sino–Russian initiative effectively claimed the 
diplomatic high ground with a proposed set of norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace 
– or “information space,” as the Chinese and Russians prefer to term it. That difference in 
terminology is noteworthy because it reflects a deeper ideological difference in how these 
governments perceive the issue of cyber security. Western countries tend to consider it as a 
matter of maintaining an open and secure Internet without constraint on content. China and 
Russia, in contrast, consider content as a key element of the information space they wish to 
safeguard.  
Although the proposed text did not explicitly address these differences in terminology, 
they would certainly emerge in any consideration of the proposal. The co-sponsors of this 
initiative were clever, however, in the form they chose for their set of norms. They presented it 
as a politically binding code of conduct rather than a legally binding agreement, even though 
traditionally both China and Russia have advocated legal instruments over political 
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arrangements. This approach reflected the increased aversion U.S. administrations have shown 
toward entering into international agreements that require Senate ratification, as opposed to 
politically binding arrangements undertaken by the executive branch alone such as codes of 
conduct. Beyond the particular case of the United States, the relative ease of state engagement 
and the general rapidity to conclude political arrangements have tended to favor them over legal 
instruments such as treaties in international security affairs (for example, the draft international 
code of conduct on outer space activities originally presented in 2008 by the European Union,)14 
China and Russia have tailored a proposal that they knew would represent an easier diplomatic 
“sell” to other states than if they had put forward a draft international treaty.  
The Devil Is in the Details 
If the form of the proposed code was skillfully designed to appeal to other countries, the 
content of the code was more problematic and likely to spark controversy. After a rather anodyne 
preamble, the Sino–Russian Code states its purpose is to identify “the rights and responsibilities 
of States in information space,” echoing the norms of responsible state behavior language set out 
in the Obama Strategy. The core of the code was contained in a set of eleven actions to which 
states were to voluntarily subscribe. While some of these measures were rather innocuous – with 
references to bolstering regional cooperation and assisting developing countries to close the 
digital divide – other actions were decidedly problematic. Three of these actions were especially 
significant, both for their potential impact on state behavior and for highlighting the challenge in 
bringing the international community to a common understanding of key norms.  
The first such action reads: “Not to use information and communication technologies, 
including networks, to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression, pose threats to 
international peace and security, or proliferate information weapons or related technologies.”15 
The second was couched as a cooperative measure: “To cooperate in combating criminal 
and terrorist activities that use information and communications technologies, including 
networks, and in curbing the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism or 
extremism, or that undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as 
their spiritual and cultural environment.”16  
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The third major action was “[t]o reaffirm all the rights and responsibilities of states to 
protect, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical 
information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage.”17  
It is evident that several of the terms used in these provisions are ambiguous and could be 
open to widely differing interpretation. Take for example the phrase “hostile activity” in the first 
measure; hostility is in the eye of the beholder and could include hosting a server which supports 
the website of an opposition group. Or consider the prohibition on “proliferation of information 
weapons or related technologies” – beyond the fact that “information weapons” as a category has 
yet to be defined, what constitutes “proliferation” of these items is also obscure. Would offering 
online subscriptions to a publication that criticizes state actions qualify as a proliferation of 
information weapons? Since one could view a cyber attack mounted from someone’s laptop as 
constituting an information weapon, would the ban on proliferation of related technologies 
extend to marketing these basic computer items? Establishing mutually acceptable definitions of 
the very equipment or capabilities the code would aim to preclude represents a major hurdle for 
any future negotiators.  
Similarly, the appeal to cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist activities calls for 
suppressing information that incites “secessionism” or undermines another country’s “economic 
and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment.”18 It is clear that 
authorities could interpret almost anything as falling under these categories, and adopting such a 
measure would provide an authoritarian regime with wide scope for censorship and repression.  
Even the superficially benign affirmation of the right of states to protect their 
“information space” could prove highly problematic in practice. What one state might view as a 
“disturbance” or even “sabotage” of their information space, another state might simply consider 
a case of exercising the right to freedom of expression. These examples of inherently 
problematic features of the text are not to suggest that the problems of a code of conduct for 
cyberspace are insurmountable or that they render the pursuit of some common ground rules as 
futile. They do, however, indicate the difficulty in arriving at provisions that would have 
comparable implications for conduct among states with differing political systems and 
ideological worldviews.  
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Moscow and Beijing appear aware that their original proposal might have provoked 
skepticism (and diplomatic opposition). In January 2015, a revised version of the Code of 
Conduct was circulated at the UN, one that reflected input received from a series of consultations 
with other states. In the covering letter, the sponsors declared that their aim was “to push forward 
the international debate on information security, and help forge an early consensus on this 
issue.”19 The revised text largely reflects the contents (and concerns) of the original, although 
there has been a major change on the international security dimension. The ambitious measures 
to prohibit information weapons and their proliferation have been deleted in favor of a far more 
general exhortation not “to carry out activities which run counter to the task of maintaining 
international peace and security.”20  
However, little change has occurred in the measures reaffirming state sovereign rights 
over Internet policy and practice. The document makes a nod towards human rights by including 
a reference to the necessity to protect an individual’s rights online as well as offline (a formula 
drawn from an earlier resolution (20/8) of the UN Human Rights Council adopted in July 2012). 
The revised document does retain a rejection of “interference” in internal affairs and the 
information control functions relating to the supposed undermining of “stability.” For the time 
being, China and Russia are proceeding cautiously with their initiative, although issuing the 
revision reflecting some input from others indicates that they are methodically building support 
for their proposal. The revised version of the Code is formatted like an actual resolution – and 
China and Russia could submit it for consideration at the UN General Assembly at any time – 
but the chief sponsors remain rather coy about their ultimate intentions.  
The UN Group of Governmental Experts 
The measured pace China and Russia are following in building support for their proposed 
Code may also be tied to a related but distinct UN process currently underway. This is the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the context of International Security,” which was established by a widely 
supported Russian-led General Assembly resolution (66/24) in 2011. The GGE (comprised of 
representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and ten other states) 
met in three one-week sessions in 2012 and 2013, and was successful in producing an agreed-
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upon report to the General Assembly for its fall 2013 session. (It is important to note that UN 
GGEs work on the basis of consensus, thus the report had to be agreed to by all the participating 
experts.) The GGE had a mandate to “study existing and potential threats in the sphere of 
information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules 
or principles of responsible behavior of States.”21 Given the strong Russian leadership behind the 
scenes on the GGE, it is not surprising that its orientation was clearly in line with the objectives 
being promoted in the Sino–Russian draft Code.  
The GGE report acknowledged the growth in threats to cyber security and the use of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) for crime and “the conduct of disruptive 
activities.” The report further recognized that “States also have an interest in preventing conflict 
arising from the use of ICTs,” and warned that “[t]he absence of common understandings on 
acceptable State behavior with regard to the use of ICTs increases the risk to international peace 
and security.” To avoid these hazards, the report concluded that “international cooperation is 
essential to reduce risk and enhance security.”22  
The form this international cooperation should take is reflected in the report’s sections on 
norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. Under the section on norms, the 
report affirmed “The application of norms derived from existing international law relevant to the 
use of ICTs by States is an essential measure to reduce risks to international peace, security and 
stability.”23 This assertion of the relevance of international law to the new domain of cyberspace 
was a key objective of the United States and other Western states. They considered it crucial for 
countries to view the existing international legal framework as compatible with and applicable to 
cyberspace. At the same time, the applicability of existing international law is immediately 
conditioned by references to the need for further study on how such norms shall apply to State 
behavior and the potential for further developing norms. Similarly, the report affirms state 
sovereignty in the conduct of ICT-related activities and in the state’s jurisdiction over ICT 
infrastructure on its territory. In short, the GGE report did not reconcile the ongoing tensions 
over the scope of state sovereignty with respect to the Internet. 
The role of confidence-building measures as voluntary steps to promote trust among 
states was another focus of the report. The GGE recommended, “States should consider the 
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development of practical confidence-building measures to help increase transparency, 
predictability and cooperation.”24 The report set out an illustrative list of possible measures 
including exchange of information on national strategies and policies; the creation of bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral consultative frameworks for confidence building; and enhanced 
mechanisms for law enforcement cooperation. Although this section presented a useful menu of 
confidence-building measures, their actual adoption is left up to states for future action.  
The report concluded on a modestly upbeat note, declaring that “[p]rogress in 
international security in the use of ICTs by States will be iterative, with each step building on the 
last.”25 A more somber outlook might stress that the iterative process may not simply move in 
the direction of enhanced security, and that state actions can detract from, as well as contribute 
to, the level of international security in cyberspace. Indeed, the revelations of sophisticated state-
conducted actions of cyber espionage and sabotage that emerged around the time of the GGE 
report’s release in 2013 such as the revelations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and 
alleged Chinese attacks on media entities and universities served to underscore the risks to global 
cyber security if “norms of responsible state behavior” are not developed and implemented.  
In order to maintain diplomatic momentum on the issue of cyber security and the role of 
states, Russia and other sponsors of the GGE process decided to immediately build on the 2013 
report by having the General Assembly agree to a further round of GGE study. In its new mode, 
an expanded GGE of 20 states has been meeting since 2014 and is slated to report by the start of 
the General Assembly’s fall session in 2015. In addition to the existing mandate with its focus on 
norms of responsible state behavior and confidence-building measures, the GGE is to study “the 
issues of the use of information and communication technologies in conflicts and how 
international law applies to the use of information and communication technologies by States.”26 
Indications are that these additional aspects are proving more difficult for the new GGE to agree 
on, and the current GGE may prove unable to produce a substantive report or any report at all. 
The group’s mandate, however, points to the type of specific problems the international 
community will need to address if it is to ever realize the call for developing general norms.  
Critics will also point to the absence of private sector or civil society involvement in 
elaborating norms. The text of the 2013 GGE report was explicit in saying that states must lead 
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on developing cyber confidence-building measures, while noting that this work would benefit 
“from the appropriate involvement of the private sector and civil society.”27 There is little 
indication that any provision is being made for the current GGE to receive input from civil 
society or the private sector, and as a result its outcome may lack credibility in certain quarters. 
Already, civil society is organizing to advocate certain state action. At the fall 2014 session of 
the UN General Assembly, nine NGOs presented a joint statement calling for states to work to 
adopt “an effective international legal framework that will prevent cyber attacks and protect the 
networked infrastructure upon which societies rely for their well-being.”28  
Despite its initial success therefore, it remains to be seen if the UN GGE process can 
contribute significantly to global norm creation, especially as states begin to articulate differing 
visions of what constitutes responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Although Russia and China 
were unable to have the 2013 GGE report go beyond a neutral “taking note” of their proposal for 
a Code of Conduct, these states will no doubt present the GGE result as validating their current 
initiative in presenting a set of global norms. Now that they have released a revised version of 
the Code of Conduct, it is possible that Beijing and Moscow may view the 2015 reporting 
deadline for the GGE – regardless of its outcome – as the logical point to bring their Code of 
Conduct proposal forward and seek its adoption by the General Assembly this fall.  
Needing a Western Response 
Whatever the diplomatic strategy Beijing and Moscow ultimately pursue, it is evident 
that Western states are reacting warily to the proposed Code. Therefore in the near term, any 
push for early adoption of the draft Code of Conduct is likely to result in a new East–West 
divide. The desire to avoid such a divisive outcome explains in large part the restraint its Sino–
Russian sponsors have shown. At the same time, the West (in particular its leading nation the 
United States) having called for the development of a global consensus on norms for responsible 
state behavior can hardly object when states respond by suggesting a set of norms of their own. 
Indeed, from the cool reception that some Western capitals have shown the Russian–Chinese 
proposal, one can discern an irritation that Beijing and Moscow have effectively stolen the 
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initiative from leading Western powers in presenting a draft set of global norms to the 
international community.  
Instead of simply being miffed over having lost the diplomatic monopoly on norms for 
responsible state conduct in cyberspace, it would be prudent for Western states to come up with 
their own version of what these global norms should include. In the competition for intellectual 
leadership on global norms for cyber security, it is not enough to simply critique China’s and 
Russia’s offerings.  
Some signs indicate that the United States is starting to articulate what appropriate norms 
and practical measures include. Officials in the State Department’s Office for Cyber Issues have 
begun in 2014 to call for cooperative measures that would preserve “stability” in cyberspace and 
remove incentives for attack. These measures would build on practices of state self-restraint, and 
seek to provide critical civilian information infrastructure with a protective status from cyber 
attack akin to that that crucial civilian infrastructure currently enjoys under international 
humanitarian law. There is express interest in pursuing agreement on confidence-building 
measures “designed to reduce the risk of escalation due to misunderstanding or miscalculation 
regarding a cyber incident of national security concern…”29 These are promising initial ideas, 
but ones which need to be formalized and presented more systematically if they are to represent a 
coherent set of norms and measures that would constitute an alternative to the Sino–Russian 
proposed Code of Conduct. Other Western states should also become more engaged in 
formulating specific standards and practices that are aligned with, and promote the vision of, 
cyberspace that these states uphold.  
A clear Western counter-proposal would also assist those states not enamored with the 
Sino–Russian text to think through some of the problems inherent in any effort to delineate 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The distinction between offensive and defensive cyber 
operations in cyber security strategies, for example, will be critical as militaries begin to 
establish cyber units and develop their capacities. In turn, governments will need to decide on 
policy limits to inform eventual rules of engagement for their militaries. For example, whether 
measures to counter cyber attacks would be limited to defensive actions only or whether and 
under what conditions would offensive cyber operations be authorized. Such internal 
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deliberations can and should be informed by multilateral debate about whether offensive cyber 
operations should be permitted in cyberspace, and if so under what constraints. Should one set of 
rules apply in peacetime and another under conditions of armed conflict that trigger the 
provisions of international humanitarian law?  
Similarly, the difference between computer network attack and computer network 
exploitation (a crucial demarcation for the military and intelligence establishments respectively) 
will require serious debate as states may seek to maintain cyber espionage while cooperating to 
curtail cyber warfare. These examples illustrate the type of thorny policy issues over which even 
like-minded Western states may differ. It will prove important for detailed consultations on these 
questions to get underway among allies and partners so that a more coherent cyber security 
foreign policy can emerge over time. This in turn will serve as a vital precondition for effective 
diplomatic engagement in forging the envisaged global consensus on norms of state conduct in 
cyberspace.  
Conclusion 
The quest for a global consensus on norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace 
needs to be purposefully taken up. The international community can ill afford to leave the 
security of cyberspace to the self-proclaimed ‘cyber warriors.’ The previous official recognition 
that such norms are desirable requires sustained follow-up. Concerned capitals will have to 
invest considerable political and diplomatic energy in any effort to forge agreements around such 
norms. While bilateral consultations and regional arrangements can help, the universal character 
of cyberspace points to a need for norms that will be global rather than particular in nature. This 
suggests eventually a dedicated multilateral process under UN auspices.  
It is time for states to move from airing broad principles to initiating a more focused 
diplomatic process to negotiate the content of the new norms. Preserving cyberspace for peaceful 
purposes on behalf of humanity requires pro-active work to forge some common arrangements to 
govern state actions. Although states will have to step up to the plate to address this challenge, 
the private sector as well as civil society, as the chief stakeholders of cyberspace, cannot afford 
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to be idle on this issue and will need to press their governments to take early and appropriate 
action if the benign character of cyberspace is to be preserved.  
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